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Abstract
The Use of Function in Infant Concept Acquisition
The use of function for concept formation in 5 and 8 month old infants 
was studied in an experiment employing a conceptual adaptation of the stan­
dard habituation paradigm. A total of 64 male and female infants were shown 
videoptaped presentations which involved changes in form and functional attri­
butes of selected stimuli. The stimuli consisted of striped figures which 
could vary in form (shmoo-shaped or H-shaped) and function (side-to-side move­
ments or up-down movements). During habituation, all infants were shown multi­
exemplars of a specific figure performing a single movement pattern; the figures 
varied only in color. During test trials, the infants were shown (1) a change 
only in form, (2) a change only in movement, (3) a change in movement contrasted 
with a change in form, or (4) a change in movement contrasted with a combined 
movement/form change. Total visual fixation times to the various changes in sti­
muli presented during test trials were compared. The results provide partial, 
but not conclusive, support for the hypothesis that function serves as the central 
core for concept acquisition in infancy at both 5 and 8 months of age. The results 
do not, however, point to a developmental age trend towards either increased or 
decreased use of functional attributes for concept acquisition.
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1Chapter 1 
Introduction
Having ascertained that infants are indeed capable of many types 
of perceptual discriminations, many infant researchers have shifted 
their attention and are currently addressing the issue of hierarchical 
organization, integration, and storage of information gained from these 
early perceptual experiences. Cohen (1979) suggests that this shift to 
cognitive concerns will help answer important questions about the early 
development of information processing. What type of information is 
stored in memory and how is it encoded? What developmental shifts are 
evident in the processing of information? What function do age and 
experience play in the organization of information? It is plausible 
that discovering the nature of information processing in the infant by 
answering these and other similar questions may provide the necessary 
foundation for unraveling the complexities of later cognitive develop­
ment.
Concept acquisition is one area under the broad umbrella of cogni­
tive functioning in infancy that has captured research attention.
Cohen (1979) and Caron and Caron (1981) both suggest that infants at a 
very early age may develop the ability to extract invariant properties 
from objects and events and form concepts based on these distinctive 
features. If, for example, the infant is shown a variety of differing 
stimuli that all share a certain common defining dimension, the infant 
will be able to recognize that they belong to the same category or con­
cept based on this similiarity. Thus, a cup, bottle, and glass all
2belong to the category of containers for drinking. Similarly, a car, 
tricycle, and wagon belong to the category of vehicles with wheels.
The infant must thus recognize that specific features of objects and 
events remain constant across a rich, complex, and rapidly changing 
environment.
Despite concurrence that concept formation undoubtedly develops its 
roots in infancy, knowledge regarding the emergence and development of 
concepts in the very young child.is incomplete. As the present time, 
many questions remain unanswered regarding the basis for early concept 
acquisition and enrichment. The research in this study will address 
itself to one such area of unresolved controversy surrounding concept 
formation: Does function serve as the essential core for concept ac­
quisition in the infant?
Before further definition and discussion of this specific problem, 
let us digress temporarily to discuss briefly what constitutes a con­
cept, what types of concepts exist, and what developmental trends are 
evident in early concept formation.
Concept Definition
The precise definition of a concept, with its accompanying theoreti­
cal implications, has been a continuing controversy in the psychological 
literature. At a very basic theoretical level, the structuralists have 
opposed the functionalists. The structuralists, including Piaget (1952), 
contend that concepts are internal entities. As such, they are "in­
dividually constructed in accordance with a child’s level of structural 
development" (Zimmerman, 1979? P* 58) and emerge in a set, maturational 
sequence. Thus, the impact that experience has on the child is indirect.
3In contrast to this, the functionalists suggest that concepts do indeed
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derive directly from one’s experience with the environment. One of 
the earliest functional theories is that which was put forth by Locke 
in 192^, later to be termed abstraction theory by Cassirer (1953)• 
According to this theory, the child will abstract common features from 
a number of diverse objects or events and will draw these commonalities 
together to form concepts. Concept formation is therefore dependent 
upon the ability to transfer that which one has learned about familiar 
stimuli to novel stimuli which share specific common characteristics. 
Thus, the child’s ability to form concepts is limited to those environ­
mental stimuli to which the child is exposed.
In more recent times, Zimmerman (1979) has developed a modified 
functional definition of concepts which states: "concepts are defined
by the discrimination of the degree of relevance of common attributes of 
stimuli or their surrounding context" (p. 62). Using this definition 
for the basis of his modern functional approach, Zimmerman addresses 
many of the current controversial issues surrounding concept definition 
and incorporates these into his postulates. Zimmerman first concurs 
with the basic premise in Lockean theory that a concept is defined in 
terms of common attributes among stimuli. However, he then broadens the 
definition of common attributes to include not only those perceptual 
features directly attached to the stimulus but also those features more 
tangentially related, including common setting, common use, and common 
user. Zimmerman also contends that all stimuli are not equally im­
portant in defining a concept but rather the relevance of each stimulus 
can be placed at some point along a continuous scale. He suggests that
ksome stimuli are more prototypic than others for concept definition.
For example, the attribute "catches mice" may be more prototypic of the 
concept "cat" than the attribute "has fur." Another issue confronted by 
Zimmerman is that of the single-versus-multiple exemplar controversy of ' 
concept definition. Proponents of the single exemplar definition be­
lieve that one exemplar is all that is needed for concept formation to 
occur. The opposing stance is formed on the belief that multiple exem­
plars are needed before the concept develops meaning for the individual. 
Zimmerman consolidates both positions by suggesting that it is possible 
to abstract specific attributes from an initial encounter with a stimu­
lus, thus forming a concept, but that encounters with multiple exemplars 
will change the relevance assigned to an attribute, enhancing and more 
clearly defining concepts and allowing for better adaptation to the 
environment.
James Gibson (1950, 1966) and Eleanor Gibson (1969) also adopt the 
functionalists point of view that environmental exposure is essential 
for concept acquisition. They contend that during early development, 
the infant learns to detect the invariant relational properties of ob­
jects from the continually changing array of perceptual features. The 
Gibsons do not envision major changes in perceptual processes during 
development, such as those set forth in Piagetian stage theory, but 
rather see this development as a continuous process (E. Gibson, 1969)- 
This continuous process is characterized by the "progressive increase 
in the specificity of discrimination to stimulus information" (E. Gibson5 
1969? P« ^50)• The Gibsons stress that the child must learn to dif­
ferentiate distinctive features, patterns, and relationships from an 
environment rich in information. It is through the reciprocal
5mechanisms of abstraction (focusing on the invariant stimuli) and 
filtering (ignoring the variant stimuli) that concept acquisition 
occurs. The Gibsons note that theirs is a theory of differentiation, 
not a theory of enrichment. The child does not need to supplement the 
stimulation already available in vast abundance in the environment but 
must instead extract progressively more exact information for perceptual
V
learning to occur.
Although the historically and currently espoused views of concept 
definition discussed above do not by any means exhaust all possible 
points of view, they do allow one to appreciate the various issues sur­
rounding concept definition and the complexity such discussion entails. 
Certainly both structuralists and functionalists would agree that con­
cept acquisition serves an obvious adaptative function for the individual. 
To quote Nelson, the use of concepts "is an economical way of dealing 
with the environment" (197&, p« hh2) • By organizing the objects and 
events in one's surroundings into concepts, the individual will'be able 
to recognize recurring themes in the various experiences encountered.
This recognition will enable the individual to form predictions about 
the world at large. If the individual can make correct predictions 
about recurring experiences, less time will be spent processing re­
dundant information and more time will be spent attending to any novel 
elements in a familiar experience that warrant attention. Thus, or­
ganizing the events and objects in one's surroundings into concepts re­
duces the complexity of the environment and allows one to focus on new 
and more interesting phenomena in one's world and function in a more 
efficient manner.
6Types of Concepts 
In addition to defining concepts, one may also categorize them. 
There are three types of concepts generally alluded to: perceptual,
relational, and functional. It is doubtful to this author that the 
three are in all respects mutually exclusive but perhaps instead share 
a degree of overlap. For the sake of clarity, however, let us look at 
each as a separate entity.
Perceptual Concepts
Concepts formed on perceptual features would be based on knowledge 
of such attributes as color, shape, size, and internal configuration. 
Among these attributes, Ruff (1980) stresses the structure of the 
object without which, she suggests, recognition of an object would be 
impossible. By structure, Ruff refers to the object's surface and edges 
and their relationship to one another. Ruff believes that the invariant 
structural qualities of an object, essential for its immediate recogni­
tion and presumably for later concept acquisition, are extracted 
through continuous visual change in the object. This visual change, 
including occlusions and perspective transformations, occurs when 
either the object moves against its own background or when the ob­
server moves in reference to the object. Thus, motion plays an im­
portant role in providing perceptual information regarding the 
structural features of objects.
Along similar lines, Cohen and Strauss (cited in Cohen, 1979) 
collected test data on 5 month old infants which suggested that form 
was retained in memory longer than color, size, or orientation. They 
familiarized the infants to a three-dimensional styrofoam figure. They
7then tested for recognition, using the same figure and one that dif­
fered in shape, size, color, or orientation. When tested immediately 
after familiarization, the infants recognized all four dimensions.
When tested 10 minutes later, they could recognize only the familiar 
form and the familiar color. After 2b hours, only form was retained 
in memory. Cohen and Strauss concluded from these results that form 
was either a more salient dimension or was processed more deeply be­
cause of its importance.
Some researchers point to color and size as infrequently perceptual 
features for concept formation (Nelson, 1979; Ruff, 1980). However, 
these features can, according to Nelson (1979) serve a useful function 
in distinguishing between individual objects assumed under the same 
. concept.
Relational Concepts
The second class of concepts to be addressed are those based on 
relational features. In contrast to the perceptual concepts, which are 
based on the presence or absence of easily observed common features, 
the relational concepts are more abstract in nature. They are based 
on the relationship between sets of attributes rather than on single 
attributes. Zimmerman (1979) uses the relational concept of "people 
who can lift their own weight." In this rather complex example, it is 
not simply knowledge of an individual’s weight or knowledge of the 
amount of weight one can lift but rather the combined knowledge of the 
two factors that must be taken into account before judging whether or 
not a specific individual rightfully belongs to the concept class. 
Certainly a myriad of other examples of relational concepts abound in
8everyday life that are less complex. For example, recognition of a 
tune, composed of a set series of notes, that remains constant despite 
raising or lowering the pitch is a more simplistic example of a re- 
lat ional c one ept.
Albert and Rose Caron (1981) stress the wide variety of relational 
concepts which apparently develop quite early in life including con­
cepts based on spatial, temporal, actional, and causal features. They 
have recently presented evidence of the ability of young infants to 
classify stimuli on the basis of various relational properties. Prob­
lems such as above-below, same-different are typical of the types of 
relational concepts presented to the infants in their laboratory. 
Functional Concepts
The last class of concepts, which form the focus of this study, 
are those of a functional basis. A strong proponent of the importance 
of function in early concept acquisition is Nelson (1973? 1976, 1977> 
1979) • Her proposed functional core model of concept formation is based 
on the assumption that there are two basic and distinct types of in­
formation that one can extract from the environment: functional
features and perceptual features. The functional features are the 
dynamic, active, experiential components of objects that comprise the 
essential core for concept acquisition. This includes the uses of an 
object, the actions of an object, and the actions imposed by others 
upon the object . . . i.e., what an object does and what can be done to 
it. For example, one may view a cup as an object for drinking, a ball 
for bouncing, or a tricycle for riding. In contrast, the perceptual 
features play a secondary role in concept formation as previously noted.
9They are of a more static nature and include such characteristics as 
shape, contour, and internal configurations of an object as -well as 
less frequently used dimensions of size and color (197&). This is not 
to say that knowledge gained from perceptual features goes unused. To 
the contrary, Nelson suggests that the perceptual features are attached 
to the conceptual core and serve to "distinguish members of one concept 
from another and to distinguish among the concept members themselves" 
(Nelson, 1976, p. ^33) • For example, one can use the perceptual 
feature of "roundness" to help identify objects that share the common 
function of rolling. Similarly, one can use identifying perceptual 
features to differentiate small balls from big balls within the 
functional category of objects that roll.
Thus, the child first forms a concept by noting the invariant 
functional actions and relations that form the core of the concept. To 
these are added the identifying perceptual features. The identifying 
features may change to some degree each time the child is exposed to 
another exemplar of the concept but the underlying essential functional 
base will remain unaltered. This knowledge of function will permit the 
child to identify new instances of the concept when exposed to the new 
potential concept members. Correct identification of. new concept mem­
bers allows the child to predict future actions and changes in such 
objects; such predictability would presumably allow the child greater 
control over his environment.
Nelson's original basis for the functional core model was her 
observations of early language acquisition in children (1979)• She 
noted that early expressive language generally consisted of a small set
10
of words for objects that move or change in some way. She found that 
’’the’ one outstanding general characteristic of the early words is their 
reference to objects and events that are perceived in dynamic relation­
ships; that is actions, sounds, transformations--in short, variation of 
all kinds’’ (1976, p.. b23) • To step backwards development ally and ex­
plore concept formation at a preverbal level, Nelson (1979) then tested 
her functional core model on 8 and 10 month, old infants. They 
hypothesized that infants would pay more attention to a change in the 
function of an object than a change in form. If the essential core of 
the infant’s concept is based on functional, dynamic properties of an 
object, then the infant should associate a certain function with a 
particular object (’’hypothesis of functional specificity," 1979? P* 5*0 • 
If there was then a change in the function of that particular object, 
the infant would be forced to alter his/her basic functional concept 
core, incorporating or integrating the new functional information with 
the old. It was hypothesized that this would require increased at­
tention on the part of the infant. If there was a change in form 
rather than function, however, the infant could simply add the new 
perceptually identifying features to the old functional core. This, 
it was assumed, would require less attention on the part of the infant.
To test this hypothesis, Nelson (1979) presented the infants with 
two mobiles, a red cross and a red scalloped circle. Each of these 
could be moved in either a circular path or a linear path on a motor- 
driven arm. The infant was seated in front of the mobile and observed 
the mobile for three 90 second trials. During the three trials, there 
was either (l) a change in movement with the same form, (2) a change in
11
form with the same movement, (3) a change in both form and movement, or 
( b ) no change in either form or movement. Using a habituation paradigm, 
the four groups were compared in terms Of visual fixation time across 
the three trials. The results indicated that the movement change groups 
showed the greatest recovery . . . i.e., both 8 and 10 month old in­
fants looked longest at a change in movement suggesting that they had 
to expand the functional specificity of the object and this required 
increased attention to integrate the new functional information with 
the previously acquired functional concept core. It is also of in­
terest to note that the group experiencing only a movement, or functional, 
change not only recovered more than the form change group but also re­
covered more than the combined form-movement change group. Nelson 
proposes that the dual form-movement change creates a new event that is 
not in competition with the old one and therefore may not require 
altering of the original concept.
Nelson's results, however, are open for at least one alternative 
interpretation. Ruff (1980) points out that the infants may have pre­
ferred the old object performing a new motion because it allowed them 
to learn more about the perceptual structure, as well of the function, 
of an object that already was somewhat familiar to them.
Another earlier experiment by Nelson (1973) also merits discussion 
because of the information it provides about functional categorization 
by the young child. In this experiment, Nelson exposed 10-15 month old 
infants to 10 different objects which were laid out on a table in front 
of the child. Included in this array were (l) a rubber ball, (2) three 
objects judged by adults to be very similar in function to the rubber
12
ball (ex.— a football that could be thrown), (3) three objects judged 
to be very similar in form to the ball (ex.— a round, smooth, heavy 
8-ball), and (h ) three objects judged dissimilar to the ball in both 
form and function (ex.— a square block). The infant -was asked to give 
the experimenter the ball. After handing the experimenter the chosen 
object, the child was again requested to give the experimenter the ball. 
This same request was repeatedly given until the child had chosen five 
different "balls." The objects were then returned to the table and the 
child was given 10 minutes to play with all 10 objects. Following this 
period of active exploration and manipulation, the verbal request to 
give the experimenter the ball was again repeated five times. When 
comparing the initial five choices with the latter five choices, Nelson 
obtained interesting results supporting her functional hypothesis. On 
the initial test, both form and functional attributes were chosen with 
equal frequency. After play with the objects, during which time it is 
assumed that the child was able to discover more about the functional 
qualities of the objects, functional attributes were chosen with 
greater frequency. These results suggest that very young children are 
capable of categorizing on a functional basis and that function can 
become more potent than form after the opportunity to interact with 
potential class members arose. This study also provided early support 
for the now more readily accepted idea that the young child can cate­
gorize objects before naming them. Although all the children in this 
particular study understood the word "ball," many d i.d not use the word 
actively in their vocabularies. Thus Nelson concluded that concept 
acquisition can occur before expressive linguistic abilities have
13
developed sufficiently to demonstrate underlying knowledge on the part 
of the child. Certainly the hulk of research reviewed in this paper 
lends further support to this same hypothesis.
Concept Development 
Strong empirical support for specific trends in early concept de­
velopment has generally not yet emerged. It has become increasingly 
obvious that the infant does not spend the early months of life in a 
perceptual/cognitive void, but the exact types of developmental changes 
that occur during this period of life are less clear. The many contro­
versial issues surrounding general human development have surfaced as 
well within the more specific area of infant concept development. One 
issue is the overly familiar nature-nurture issue, which has found some 
resolution in the organismic point of view. Because of the early ages 
involved in infant research, questions of innate versus learned behavior 
are fertile fields for exploration. Another major issue is that of 
continuity versus discontinuity, as articulated in Werner’s (1957) 
orthogenetic principle that stresses the synthesis of two opposing 
trends: discontinuous differentiation and continuous hierarchic inte­
gration (Langer, 19 70 ). Within the wide scope of the continuity versus 
discontinuity issue, questions arise concerning the cognitive structures 
underlying concept formation. This is one area in which there appears 
to be at least partial consensus among some researchers (Kagan, 1979j 
Nelson, 1977; Ruff, 1980) that concept formation evolves within a 
cognitive structure that evidences a developmental shift from the 
acquisition of experientially based concepts to more context-free, 
logically derived, relational concepts. Initially, the child forms
lh
event-based concepts. At this level, the child’s concepts are very con­
crete and based on real world events occurring within a specific con­
text. With some variation in definition, this has been referred to as 
an event structure (Nelson, 1977)? episodic memory (Posner and Warren, 
1972), or scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1977)* All of these connote an 
event occurring within a spatial and temporal framework that has specific 
boundaries. For example, the child may recognize his father's car when 
it is parked in front of their house but may not recognize the same car 
when it is parked in a shopping center parking lot. As the child 
matures, his concepts will become more abstract and context-free. At 
this point, the individual begins to recognize the logical relationships 
between concepts, including "similarities and differences in attribute 
structures" (Nelson, 1977* P« 2 2 3 )• Nelson refers to this as categorical 
knowledge . . . "knowledge that groups concepts into hierarchical 
taxonomies defining superordinate, subordinate, and coordinate relations" 
(1977, p- 222). Kagan refers to a seemingly similar structure as the 
symbolic category, defining it as "an arbitrary representation of the 
shared dimensions of a set■of events" (19795 P* 1&7)• At this point in 
development, the child will recognize that daddy’s car is a part of the
larger category of motor vehicles but has specific invariant features
#
that remain constant across a varying environmental background that 
allows one to identify it and differentiate it from other cars. Thus, 
the child will recognize that a 1976 orange Volkswagen with a dent in 
the right front fender is still daddy's car regardless of where it is 
parked. The development of such context-free concepts will depend, 
according to Ruff (1980), upon exposure to the invariant features of
15
the concept in a variety of circumstances. Unless the child is exposed 
to the concept in multiple and differing situations, the child will not 
be able to extract all the essential invariant elements necessary for 
more highly efficient and rich concept formation involving the ongoing 
dual processes of differentiation and generalization.
Another general trend in concept development that has been fairly 
well documented is the shift from the processing of visual elements to 
the processing of total configurations in visual stimuli (Caron and 
Caron, I98O; Cohen, 1975)* Prior to 3 months of age, the infant's 
attention appears to be captured by a single, or limited number of 
features of an object or pattern; thus perception is limited to the 
parts, not the whole. At this age, the infant is capable of processing 
high contrast angles and edges (Bower, 1966; Haith and Campos, 1977; 
Salapatek, 1975)* For example, Salapatek and Kessen (1966) demonstrated 
that 1 and 2 month old infants will focus their attention on the high 
contrast edges of a black triangle on a white background. When com­
paring the performance of the 1 and 2 month old infants on this task, 
Salapatek and Miller (cited in Salapatek, 1975) found that the 1 month 
old infants tended to fixate on one specific feature— typically a vertex 
of the triangle— whereas the 2 month old infant's eye movements 
followed the overall high-contrast outline of the triangle. This 
suggests some developmental change even in these early months. From 
approximately 3-5 months of age, "simple dimensions such as colors and 
forms can be processed as units" (Cohen, 1979j P- ^9^) and these units 
can be defined relationally. For example, Schwartz (1975) demonstrated 
that 2 - k month old infants were able to process the relationship of
16
line segments forming angles of various degrees and recognize constancy 
of angles despite orientation changes. Also at this stage, the infant 
can discriminate one configuration from another when both are made up of 
differing arrangements of the same elements (Caron and Caron, 19^1; 
Cornell, 1975; Vurpillot, Ruel, and Castrec, 1977)- Milewski (1979)? 
for example, used his operant high-amplitude sucking technique to 
demonstrate that the infant as young as 3 months of age could discriminate 
differences in visual pattern arrangement. He found that the infants 
were capable of differentiating between three dots arranged in a vertical 
line and three dots placed in a triangular arrangement. He additionally 
provided evidence that the infant did not use contour density or position 
cues but rather detected pattern configuration as the perceptual in­
variant .
It is not until 5 months of age, however, that the infant can 
process total configurations made up of disparate items (Caron and Caron, 
I 98O; Cohen, 1979)• For example, a cross and a circle are seen as 
separate components until 5 months of age, at which time the two become 
encoded as a compound . . . cross within circle (Bower, 1966; Cornell 
and Strauss, 1973? Miller, 1972). Similarly, recognition of total human 
facial configuration does not appear until approximately 5 months of age 
(Caron, Caron, Caldwell, and Weiss, 1973)* At ^ months of age, infants 
are unable to detect "faceness," the invariant configuration of eyes, 
nose, and mouth. At this age, the eyes are more salient than the nose 
and mouth, and the head outline is more prominent than the inner facial 
pattern. By 5 months of age, however, the facial features have become 
integrated and the infant is able to process total facial configuration
17
as a separate entity.
This shift from the processing of components to the processing of 
configurations, coupled with the apparent shift from context-contained 
to context-free conceptualization are but two of the developmental 
changes thought to occur early in life. Certainly their impact on the 
types of concepts formed during infancy should be substantial. In order 
to deterjnine that such specific developmental changes occur regarding 
concept formation, a new methodology has evolved during the past twenty 
years which allows us to examine the nature of conceptual organization 
in the infant. Needless to say, the infant’s response repertoire is 
limited. Taping his responses required the development and use of an 
ingenious procedure: the habituation paradigm.
The Conceptual Habituation Paradigm
The habituation paradigm has been the tool of choice for most 
researchers studying concept acquisition in infancy. Habituation is 
generally defined as. a response decrement resulting from the repeated 
presentation of a stimulus. As the stimulus becomes more familiar with 
repeated exposure, the orienting reaction to it grows weaker; this 
results in decreased attention to the stimulus and subsequent decreased 
responding to it. This decrease in attention is thought to reflect 
the acquisition of internal representation of the stimulus. The incom­
ing stimuli are compared to the memory model of past stimuli; when the 
two match, attention is inhibited and habituation occurs. Thus 
habituation is probably suggestive of a primitive form of memory (Jeffrey 
and Cohen, 1971)•
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The research in this particular study -will he based on a combina­
tion of two different habituation techniques: Fantz’s (1964) paired
comparison technique and McGurk’s (1972) conceptual variation of the 
standard habituation paradigm. Both are based on Fantz’s premise that 
the infant will demonstrate a visual novelty preference; when the in­
fant is presented with a familiar and a novel stimulus, the infant will 
prefer to look at the novel stimulus. From this, one can infer that 
the infant has discriminated between the two stimuli.
Fantz’s paired comparison technique involves an experimentally 
induced preference for novelty. The infant is repeatedly shown a 
single stimulus until the infant’s decreased looking time implies that 
habituation has taken place. The infant is then simultaneously pre­
sented with the familiar stimulus and the novel stimulus. Increased 
looking time at the novel stimulus implies that the infant recognizes 
the difference between the two stimuli and prefers to watch the new, 
unfamiliar one.
McGurk’s method is an adaptation of the standard.habituation 
paradigm. Like Fantz’s design, it also employs an experimentally in­
duced novelty preference. Unlike Fantz’s design, the stimuli shown 
during the habituation period are not identical. Using McGurk’s 
technique, the infant is instead shown a variety of different, stimuli 
that all belong to the same category or concept. The infant is re­
peatedly exposed to these same stimuli until the infant’s decreased 
attention demonstrates that he has habituated to them. The infant is 
then tested with a new member of the same category and a non-member.
If the infant’s visual attention does not increase to the new concept
19
member b>ut does increase to the non-member, it is assumed that the 
infant has adequately remembered the concept and has been able to 
generalize his habituation to the ne,w member while dishabituating to 
the unfamiliar non-member. Such a response would suggest that the 
infant has been able to detect the invariant features of a concept 
through repeated exposure to the multiple exemplars of that same con­
cept. This ability to extract the common defining properties of ob­
jects and events across a changing array of perceptual features there­
fore indicates that the child is capable of forming concepts to 
organize input from the environment.
The results achieved using this modified habituation paradigm for 
the study of concept acquisition have been encouraging. To quote 
Caron and Caron, "these studies indicate that recognition of con­
stancy across change is probably the rule rather than the exception in
normal infant perception, and that it occurs quite early in life”
\
(1981). Empirical evidence is accumulating showing that young infants 
are capable of responding to many types of invariant properties. A 
review of selected examples of research in this area, utilizing 
various combinations of both Fantz’s and McGurk’s methods of habitua­
tion, will serve to illustrate conceptualization in the young infant.
Let us first look at McGurk’s (1972) experiment which employed 
the adapted habituation paradigm discussed above. McGurk’s results 
provided strong evidence that infants as young as 6 months of age 
could recognize the invariant property of form constancy against 
changing orientations. His infants were first habituated to a simple 
stick figure that was either presented in a constant, static orientation
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or rotated in a changing orientation during the familiarization trials. 
During testing, all infants were then exposed to two additional 
stimuli, the familiar stick figure and a novel stick figure, both of 
which were presented in a completely new orientation. For those in­
fants that saw the stick figure rotated to various positions during 
habituation, McGurk found little recovery to the same form in a new 
orientation but did find evidence of recovery when these same infants 
were exposed to the changed form in the new orientation. For those 
infants initially exposed to only a single, static orientation of the 
original stick figure during habituation trials, McGurk found equally 
increased looking time to both the familiar figure in the new orienta­
tion and the unfamiliar figure in the new orientation. These results 
suggest that by 6 months of age, infants can recognize the unchanging, 
invariant properties of form across changes in orientation. The in­
fants could generalize their habituation across the various exemplars 
of the same category, forming a concept based on shape constancy.
Constancy across change has also been studied by Bornstein (1976, 
1978, 1979) using color as the independent variable. He first es­
tablished that b month old infants could discriminate changes in hue 
(1976, 1978). it was found that infants who were habituated to a 
single hue dishabituated to a novel color during test. Next, Bornstein
(1979) habituated month old infants to a variety of hues (blue,
* \
yellow, red, etc.) and found that these same infants generalized their 
habituation to a novel hue that was presented during test. Bornstein 
concluded from these results that the infants not only discriminated 
between various colors, but also demonstrated the higher level function
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of abstracting the invariant property of chromaticity per se.
Auditory stimuli have also been used to study concept formation 
(McCall and Melson, 1970; Horowitz, 1972). Chang and Trehub's study 
(1977) is of particular interest for the information it sheds on con­
cept acquisition in the young infant. They hypothesized that the 5 
month old infant would code auditory stimuli in terms of configurations 
or pattern instead of individual elements. In order to test whether or 
not such temporal relational coding does indeed occur, they first 
habituated their infants to a repeated six tone pattern. During test, 
the infants then heard either a transposed version of the standard 
pattern (raised or lowered from the standard) or a scrambled version of
the transposed pattern. By using cardiac deceleration as the response
*
measure, Chang and Trehub found that the infants who were exposed to 
the transformed pattern during test did not dishabituate whereas those 
exposed to the scrambled version did dishabituate. These results sug­
gest that the 5 month old infant is capable of processing the rela­
tional information contained in a six tone pattern. The infants 
recognized the familiar pattern in the transposed version and found 
it similar to the standard. The scrambled version was found to be 
dissimilar and resulted in a novelty response.
Several visual habituation experiments have focused on the use of 
human faces to study concept acquisition in the infant. Cornell (197*0 
used Fantz’s (196*1) paired comparison technique to look at possible 
developmental differences in concept formation between 19 and 23 week 
old infants. In this study, the infants were habituated to a specific 
category of faces. They saw either (l) different faces that shared
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the common dimension of sex (multi-exemplars of male or female faces), 
(2) a single male and female face in varying poses, or (3) the same 
male or female face in the same pose. After a series of six habituation 
trials, all infants were then exposed to a paired comparison of the 
male and female face seen in condition 3* Cornell found that the 19 
week old infants were unable to generalize their habituation under any 
of the three conditions. In contrast, the 23 week old infants were 
able to generalize their habituation under all three conditions, pre­
ferring the novelty of the opposite sex face to the familiar same sex 
face during testing. Thus, the older infant could categorize the faces 
by (l) invariant sex, (2) invariant facial configuration against 
changing orientation, or (3) invariant facial configuration with ac­
companying orientation constancy. These results suggest that the older 
infant has the capacity to categorize faces in varying ways, depending 
upon how the task was structured.
In 1976, Fagan expanded Cornell’s (197^) work to further examine 
the infant’s ability to form concepts based on the recognition of in­
variant facial features. He conducted a series of five paired com­
parison experiments using 29 week old infants. The first experiment 
was. designed to focus on Fagan’s concern that Cornell did not demon­
strate that the infants could reliably discriminate between the various 
same-sex faces shown during familiarization and those shown during 
test . . . i.e., the subjects in Cornell’s photographs were quite 
similar in appearance and could conceivably be mistaken for one another. 
To eliminate this problem, Fagan established experimentally that his 
infants could in fact discriminate between two particular male faces
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that wer.e very dissimilar in appearance. Secondly, Fagan established 
that the infants could discriminate between facial poses (front, three- 
fourths, and profile) of either of these male figures. Thus he deter­
mined, unlike Cornell, that the infant in all probability could make 
these distinctions. He then utilized this information in his final 
three experiments which focused on invariant facial features. In the 
third experiment, he demonstrated that the infants could recognize the 
same male face in different poses (invariant facial configuration 
against changing orientation). In the fourth and fifth experiments, 
he demonstrated that 7 month old infants could abstract male and fe­
male characteristics and categorize faces based on these invariant 
sexual features.
In 1979? Cohen and Strauss conducted an experiment similar to 
Cornell’s and Fagan’s in concept but differing in design. Instead of 
using a set familiarization period, they used DeLoache's (1973) common 
proportional criteria of habituation to avoid confusing lack of habitu­
ation with lack of concept generalization. Like Fagan, they also were 
concerned that the subjects in Cornell* s photographs were too similar 
in appearance and consequently chose to use photographs of human faces 
that were markedly different from one another. They habituated 18,
2 h 9 and 30 week old infants to (l) a particular orientation of a 
particular female face, (2) a particular female face in varying 
orientation, and (3) varying female faces in varying orientations. 
During the test phase, all infants saw one familiar female face and 
one novel female face, both with a new facial expression and in a new 
orientation not previously seen. Cohen and Strauss found that the
2k
18 and 2k week old infants could not generalize their habituation but 
that the 30 week old infants could generalize their habituation to 
(l) varying orientations of the same face, and (2) varying female faces.
Thus, Cornell, Fagan, and Cohen and Strauss all appear to have 
demonstrated that the infant is "capable of abstracting or differenti­
ating appropriate conceptual categories regarding the human face"
(Cohen and Strauss, 1979? P- k 2 2 ) . Although the three studies yield 
fairly similar results, there is not total resolution about the age 
at which such concept acquisition evolves. At approximately U 1/2 
months of age, such facial conceptualization apparently is not a part 
of the infant’s repertoire. By approximately 7 l/2 months of age, 
the infant appears to have mastered these concepts. It is less clear, 
however, what happens between these two ages. Cornell and Cohen and 
Strauss obtained conflicting results with the infant of approximately 
6 months of age. It is possible that a transition period occurs be­
tween k and 7 months of age leading to the conceptualization of facial 
identity and sex. This would support the findings of Caron, Caron, 
Caldwell, and Weiss (1973) that the processing of total facial con­
figuration appears at approximately 5 months of age.
Not only have researchers been attempting to delineate age-related 
changes in concept formation, but they have also begun to explore dif­
ferences in concept acquisition between normal and abnormal infant 
populations (Fagan, Fantz, and Miranda, 1975; Miranda and Fantz, 197*+; 
Miranda, 1976). The Carons (1980) focused on one specific high-risk 
population by comparing the performance of term and pre-term infants 
on problems requiring the abstraction of relational information.
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Recognizing that the infant with neonatal complications is at risk for 
later cognitive dysfunction, the Carons hypothesized that later in­
tellectual impairment may be preceded by early deficits in relational 
processing. As a preliminary investigation into this area, the Carons 
presented four problems involving relational concepts to term and pre­
term infants, ranging in age from 12 to 2b months.
The 12 month old infants were given a problem entitled face- 
nonface. Using McGurk1s multiple exemplar habituation technique, the 
infants were first exposed to four line-drawn faces, each of which had 
eyes and noses composed of different geometric shapes (one with circu­
lar eyes and nose, one with triangular eyes and nose, etc.). Despite 
these differences in elements, all shared the common relational 
property of normal facial configuration, with eyei% nose, and mouth in 
proper alignment. After habituation to these four exemplars, the 
infant was then shown four new stimuli during test, all possessing 
eyes and noses of new geometric shapes not previously seen. Two were 
similar in configuration to those seen during habituation; the other 
two had distorted facial configurations in which theqyes, nose and 
mouth were not in normal alignment. The second problem given to 
18 month old infants, focused on the relational concept of above-below. 
The habituation stimuli consisted of pictures of varying geometric 
shapes; in each picture, a smaller geometric object was always placed 
above a larger geometric object. In test, the infants saw new geo­
metric shapes in both the old configuration and in a new configuration 
in which the objects were reversed with the large object placed above 
the small one. The third problem, given to 21 month old infants,
2 6
addressed the concept of same-different. During habituation, the 
infants saw pairs of line drawn faces which were identical. During 
test, the infants were asked to differentiate between more sets of 
"twin” faces and sets of dissimilar faces. In the last problem, 2k 
month old infants were asked to abstract the invariant relational 
property of facial expression. During habituation, the infants saw 
four photographs of different females, all with a neutral expression. 
During test, the infants saw new females, exhibiting both neutral ex­
pressions and smiles. All four of these problems contained stimuli 
that could be encoded in terms of the absolute properties of their 
elements (ex.— shape, size, etc.) or in terms of the relationship 
between the elements (ex.— little above big).. For example, let us look 
at the above-below problem. The infant can encode this problem in one 
of two ways. If the infant’s looking time increases during test to the 
two new pictures of geometric shapes which are still in the same above- 
below configuration, it is assumed that the infant is encoding the 
absolute properties of the geometric elements. If, on the other hand, 
the infant’s looking time increases more dramatically to the two 
pictures in which there is a new configuration (big above little) as 
well as new elements, then it is assumed that the infant has success­
fully encoded the relational configurational information contained in 
the stimuli.
To measure the type of encoding used, the Carons devised two 
visual scores: a configural discrimination score representing re­
lational encoding and a component discrimination score representing 
element encoding. On three out of the four problems, the pre-term
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infants yielded significantly lower configuration discrimination scores 
than did the term infants (only neutral-smile did not reach signifi­
cance). On component scores, the pre-term infants did not score signifi­
cantly higher than the term infants, as predicted, hut more pre-term 
infants did dishabituate to the change in components only than did full- 
term infants. These results suggest that the pre-term infants were 
able to discriminate changes in stimuli components but did not notice 
the change in overall configuration that the full-term infants observed.
Problem
In all of the forementioned studies, the habituation paradigm has 
proved an effective tool for studying early concept formation in the 
infant. Overall, the results of these same studies have shown that 
concept acquistion does appear to evolve at a very early age. However, 
our knowledge bank regarding the precise manner in which concepts are 
formed certainly is not yet complete. The present study is designed to 
focus on one aspect of conceptual organization for which research re­
sults are currently inconclusive: Does function serve as the essential
core for concept acquisition in the infant? Nelson (1977, 1979), as 
previously noted, answers affirmatively to this question, arguing 
strongly for the primacy of function in early concept formation.
Others (Kagan, 1979; Ruff, 1980) suggest that the answer may not be so 
simplistic. Ruff, for example, stresses instead the combined importance 
of form and function. The answer to this question is important not 
only for the light it sheds on basic concept formation in infancy per 
se, but also upon its applied significance. Intervention with high- 
risk infant populations is a common phenomenon in our society, based on
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the assumption that early intervention may reduce later cognitive 
dysfunction. If one -were to determine the specific type of information 
most essential for early concept formation, this same type of informa­
tion could he used for cognitive therapeutic intervention--or simply 
for encouraging healthy development in the normal infant.
A second question posed by this study is the following: Are there
differences between 5 and 8 month old infants in terms of their use of 
functional properties for concept definition? In Nelson’s 1979 study, 
it was found that both 8 and 10 month old infants spent more time 
processing functional changes than they did processing changes in form. 
The following study, which utilizes habituation techniques different 
from those employed by Nelson, will attempt to provide further evalua­
tion for Nelson’s contention that 8 month old infants use function as 
the primary basis for concept formation. Additionally, it will look 
at concept acquisition prior to 8 months of age. If indeed functional 
attributes are the primary core of early concepts, it is hypothesized 
that the 5 month old infant will also prefer to focus on function 
over form for concept formation. Previously cited research has demon­
strated that by 5 months of age, the infant is capable of forming 
various types of relational concepts (Bornstein, 1976, 1979; Caron, 
Caron, Caldwell, and Weiss, 1973; Chang and Trehub, 1977; Milewski, 
1979). If, in fact, function is the defining dimension for early con­
cepts, simple functional concepts should also be emerging by 5 months 
of age. It is additionally possible that a developmental shift may 
occur between 5 and 8 months of age but at the present time there is 
no concrete evidence that such a shift does occur nor knowledge of the
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anticipated direction of that shift (form to function, or function to 
form) .
The present series of four experiments were designed to address 
these two major questions by using the habituation paradigm to measure 
visual attention to videotaped presentations involving changes in both 





The final sample consisted of 6b healthy, fall-term infants from 
predominantly white, middle class suburban families (mean parental 
education level of 17 years). These infants were divided into two 
groups: 32 5-nionth old infants (1^0-15^- days of age) and 32 8-month
old infants (231-2^5 days of age). There were equal numbers of U males 
and b females of each age in each of b experimental groups, for a total 
of l6 subjects per condition. Ten additional infants were tested but 
6 were excluded from the study due to changes in state (fussing, crying, 
sleeping, etc.) and U were excluded due to experimenter error.
The majority of parents volunteered their infants in response to 
notices in local childbirth education newsletters; others volunteered 
after referral by their pediatricians. All infants had uneventful pre- 
and post-natal circumstances, with 5 minute Apgar scores ranging from 
8-10- Gestational ages were 38-^2 weeks; birth weights were greater 
than 2500 grams. The mother's condition prior to and during the time 
of delivery was essentially free of common risk factors; deliveries 
under general anesthesia and unplanned caesarian-sect ion deliveries 
were eliminated from the study. Infants with obvious signs of pre­
maturity (neurological immaturity, specific respiratory problems, etc.) 
and post-maturity (dry skin, long fingernails, aging placenta, etc.) 
were also excluded.
Apparatus
The infants -were individually tested during their normal waking 
hours. They were seated on their parent's lap in a darkened 210 x 
300 cm room, facing the center of a brown framing screen which was 
located 70 cm in front of them. There were two 28 x 21 cm windows cut 
out of the frame, each located 9 cm to the left or right of the center 
of the frame. Through the windows, the infants could watch the various 
videotape cassette presentations projected on two 29 cm colored video­
tape monitors located behind the cut-out windows. To the side of the 
infant was a large partitition which hid the examiner who monitored the 
recording apparatus, as well as the apparatus itself, from the infant’s 
view. The recording apparatus consisted of two Sony Betamax video 
cassette recorders which were connected to the color monitors and also 
connected to a special purpose computer. Each trial on the video­
cassette was preceded by a 2,500 Hz tone and terminated by a 313 Hz 
tone. These tones respectively activated and deactivated the computer 
for recording purposes during each trial. A hand held device attached 
to the computer contained left and right push buttons for scoring the 
respective direction, and length of visual fixation during the various 
trials. Following the entire test session, the computer read-out 
provided total fixation time per position per trial.
The infant’s visual fixations were monitored by closed circuit 
television. A small U cm aperture was located directly between and 
3 cm above the openings for the colored monitors. A closed circuit 
camera lens was placed in this opening, focusing on the infant's face. 
This facial image was carried to a monitor located behind the partition
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for viewing "by the examiner. Fantz’s corneal reflection technique was
used to measure visual fixations which were recorded on the scoring
device. On the monitor, the examiner determined if superimposition of
the left or right videotaped stimuli over the pupils of the infants’
eyes occurred, and if so, recorded this as a fixation on the computer.
Each fixation was terminated when the infants looked away for at least
.5 seconds. Inter-rater reliability for this procedure was established
by having two examiners independently recording infant visual fixations
on two separate computers. An agreement consisted of a difference of
<_ 1.5 seconds of total looking time to one screen over a single 10
second trial. A disagreement occurred when the recorded difference
exceeded 1.5 seconds. Using the formula agreements - disagreements,
agreements + disagreements
inter-rater reliability (over a total of 32 trials on two subjects) was
calculated to be Qhrfo.
Stimulus
The infants were shown colored videotapes of two-dimensional card­
board stimuli consisting of various combinations of shmoo-shaped figures 
and H-shaped figures (Figure l). All of the figures had stripes and 
two large black eyes. They varied in color. One shmoo-shaped figure 
and one H-shaped figure had blue and yellow stripes; one of each had 
turquoise and orange stripes; another of each had purple and green 
stripes; and the final two had red and white stripes. The figures 
were capable of moving in one of two patterns, either bouncing slowly 
up and down in the same place or moving more rapidly with short hops 
from side to side. The figures, suspended from invisible strings,
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Figure 1
Shmoo-shaped and H-shaped stimuli
3^
moved against a plain light blue "background.
Procedure
This series of four experiments theoretically replicates Nelson's 
1979 form-function mobile study cited earlier. The methodology em­
ployed is different, however, drawing on a combination of Fantz’s 
paired comparison technique (196U) and McGurk*s (1972) conceptual 
adaptation of the standard habituation paradigm.
During each session, the infants saw the same videotape two times 
in succession with an approximately 2 minute interval between the two 
presentations. This repetition was deemed necessary after trial runs 
suggested that a single presentation of the tape provided viewing 
time which was insufficient for adequate information processing to 
take place. The videotape was approximately 2 minutes in duration and 
consisted of: (l) a warm up segment, (2) 6 segments constituting
habituation trials, and (3) 2 test segments. Each of these segments 
was 10 seconds in duration. The intertrial interval between- all 
segments was 3 seconds. The tone which signaled termination of the 
previous trial was delivered during the first .5 seconds of this 
interval. During the final .5 seconds of the interval, the tone 
signaling the start of a new trial was heard. During all 3 seconds, 
the infant saw only videotaped footage of the plain blue background.
Prior to the start of the test session, the parents were asked by 
the experimenter to refrain from talking to or interacting with their 
infant while the tape was being shown, except to comfort the infant 
if the child became upset. The parent then accompanied the infant to 
the testing room. When both were comfortably seated, the videotape
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presentation was shown.
For the warm-up segment, each'infant saw a 10 second videotaped 
presentation of a rotating multi-colored cloth stuffed infant toy- 
resembling a flower with a face in the center. The warm-up segment 
was presented simultaneously on both videotape monitors and served to 
orient the infant towards the two monitors.
Using McGurk* s technique, the infants were then exposed to multi­
exemplars of a specific movement paired with a specific shape during a 
series of 6 fixed habituation trials. Each habituation trial consisted 
of 10 seconds of videotaped footage showing either shmoo-shaped or 
H-shaped figures that varied in color repeatedly performing on one of 
the two movement patterns. The exemplars were presented on one of 
the two videotape monitors during the 6 habituation trials; their 
appearance on either the left or right screen was randomly ordered.
In all, each infant saw three color variants (orange and turquoise, 
purple and-green, vand blue and yellow) of the same shaped figure per­
forming the same movement (high slow bounces or quick side-to-side 
jumps) during habituation. Each colored form was seen a total of 2 
times. The color of the six stimuli seen in succession on the two 
monitors was randomly ordered.
Fantz*s paired comparison technique was used during test to 
measure selective visual attention to one of the two screens which 
were simultaneously running videotape footage. In the test sequence, 
the infants saw the familiar shmoo- or H-shaped figures observed 
during habituation but they were now composed of novel red and white 
stripes not previously seen. As such, they served as new exemplars
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for a variety of possible concepts formed during habituation. The 
specific combination of shapes and movement patterns seen during test 
depended upon the experimental condition and will be further elaborated 
upon below. During the two test segments, the left and right video­
taped presentations were reversed to avoid position bias on the part of 
the infant. In all four experimental conditions, shapes and movement 
patterns were counterbalanced throughout habituation and test trials to 
prevent ordering effects.
Experimental Condition 1 . The first experiment was conducted 
simply to ascertain that both 5 and 8 month old infants could in fact 
discriminate between the two different shapes of stimuli used through­
out all of the experiments. The l6 infants participating in this 
particular experiment were first habituated to either multi-exemplars 
of shmoo-shaped or H-shaped figures using the method described above. 
During test, the infants saw a paired comparison of two red and white 
striped figures: the familiar shape seen during habituation versus the
shape not previously seen. Both figures were performing the same move­
ment pattern seen during the habituation trials. Total visual fixation 
time to the novel and familiar shapes, combined across the two test 
trials, were compared.
Experimental Condition 2. In the second experiment, l6 infants 
were asked to discriminate a change only in function, i.e. differentiate 
between the slow vertical bounces and the quick longitudinal jumps.
Not only did this experiment seek to establi sh that both 5 and 8 month 
old infants could successfully discriminate between the two different 
movement patterns, but it also provided a basis against which to compare
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changes involving combinations of form and function seen in experimental 
conditions 3 and k . In this experiment, the infants were again ex­
posed to the same habituation series, involving multiple exemplar ex­
posure to either shmoo-shaped or H-shaped figures repeatedly performing 
one of the two movement patterns. During test, these same infants saw 
the familiar figure, now with red and white stripes, on both screens.
On one screen, the figure was performing the same movement pattern seen 
during habituation while the novel movement was seen on the other screen. 
Once again, visual fixation times to the novel and familiar stimuli 
were totaled over two test trials and compared.
Experimental Condition 3 » In the third experiment, which was a 
critical test of Nelson’s functional core hypothesis, the infant’s 
visual fixation time to a change in shape was compared to visual 
fixation time to a change in function. It was hypothesized that looking 
time should be greater to the novel function than to the novel form. 
During habituation, a group of 16 infants saw the 6 trials of multi­
colored shmoo-shaped or H-shaped figures repeatedly performing one 
specific movement pattern. During test, the infants simultaneously saw 
a red and white striped shmoo-shaped figure and a red and white striped 
H-shaped figure on adjacent screens. On one screen, they saw the 
familiar shape seen during habituation, only it was now performing a 
new movement pattern. On the other screen, the infants saw the novel 
figure performing the familiar movement pattern seen during habituation. 
Once again, total looking time to the two stimuli across two test 
trials was compared.
Experimental Condition k . An interesting question was posed by 
the fourth experiment: does the infant find a change only in function
more captivating than a combined change in both form and function? 
Adopting Nelson’s hypothesis, a new function attached to a familiar 
form should increase visual time more than a dual change in both form 
and function. When a new function is attached to an already familiar 
form, the infant is presumably forced to change the underlying 
functional base for concept formation. If, however, the infant is 
presented with a new form that performs a new function, the infant is 
able to simply create a new concept that is not in interference with 
the old one established during habituation; this should require less 
time than alteration of the original concept necessitated by a change 
only in function. To test this hypothesis, the l6 infants in experi­
mental condition k were first habituated to the 6 trial series of the 
multi-exemplar shmoo- and H-shaped figures, repeatedly performing the 
same movement pattern. During test, the infants saw the familiar shape 
performing a novel movement pattern, coupled with a novel shape per­
forming a novel movement pattern. If, for example, the infant saw 
shmoo-shaped figures bouncing up and down during habituation, the in­
fant would then see a paired comparison of the red and white shmoo- 
shaped figure jumping laterally and the novel red and white H-shaped 
figure jumping laterally during test. As in the other experiments, 
total fixation times to the two stimuli seen during test were totaled 





The major dependent variable of interest in this study is the
novelty preference score, computed as the total amount of fixation to
the novel stimulus (N) on both test trials divided by overall looking
to the novel and the familiar (?) stimulus combined on both trials,
i.e., N (Caron and Caron, 1981). This score -was computed 
N+F
separately for the first session, second session, and both sessions 
combined 'within each experimental condition. A score value of 50^ on 
this measure 'would indicate that the infant responded equally to the 
novel and familiar stimuli at test. If the value significantly ex­
ceeded 50$>, the infant looked longer at the novel stimulus. A score 
significantly less than 50% 'would indicate that the familiar stimulus 
■was preferred. In conditions 3 and b ? -where both test stimuli -were 
novel, the stimuli involving change in movement alone -were arbitrarily 
designated novel, since Nelson -would predict greater attention to this 
change.
An initial question of interest -was -whether infants in the various 
experimental conditions discriminated the novel stimulus. According to 
Nelson’s theory, as noted, the infants should have demonstrated a 
strong novelty preference to changes in the function of objects (in 
this case, to changes in their movement) -which force re-conceptualiza­
tion of object meaning. Since inspection of the data revealed that 
there -were no marked differences between sessions one and two, the
bo
novelty scores were totaled across both sessions for computational 
purposes. The mean combined novelty scores of Age x Sex x Condition 
subgroups are shown in Table I. To test for successful discrimination, 
separate t-tests were initially conducted for the deviation of the 
overall Condition means (bottom row of Table i) from a chance score 
of 50$. Of the four t-tests, one proved statistically significant, 
that for the Movement Change Condition (Condition 2)--t(15)=2.01, 
p ^  .05. In the Movement vs. Shape Condition (Condition 3)3 the mean 
approached significance (t(l5)=1.67, .10). These data, combined
with the absence of significant discrimination in the Shape Condition 
(Condition l) are therefore consistent with Nelson's general position. 
Less consistent with her position is the lack of an effect in Condition 
b (Movement vs. Movement plus Shape), where stronger fixation of 
movement change alone at test would have been expected. It should also 
be noted that the major contribution to the Condition 3 effect came 
from the 5 month old infants (t_(7)=l«9^ -j P ^  *05) ? with the 8 month old 
infants responding just about at chance (M=50.1+). In Condition 2, the 
8 month old infants significantly discriminated the new movement 
pattern (t(7)=2.10, p <  .05) but not the 5 month olds. No other sub­
group or combined means were significantly discrepant from chance.
The previous analysis examined whether the various Condition and 
subgroup means deviated from chance value but did not tell us whether 
these means differed from one another. An initial question in this 
regard involved the comparison of Conditions 1 and 2 (Shape Change vs. 
Movement Change). An 2(Age) x 2(Sex) x 2(Condition) ANOVA restricted 
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effects (Table II), thus indicating that -while change in movement alone 
-was significantly discriminated from chance, it was not discriminated 
to a greater extent than change in shape alone. A comparable 
analysis restricted to Conditions 3 and ^ also yielded no significant 
effects, indicating that change in movement was not discriminated more 
strongly when it was contrasted with change in shape than when it was 
contrasted with change in movement plus shape (Table III).
It was also of interest to determine whether there were any dif­
ferences in the novelty scores as a function of stimulus characteris­
tics. To this end, an analysis of 2(Age) x 2(Sex) x 2(Shape), with 
shmoo-shaped figures and H-shaped figures constituting the two shape 
variables,, was conducted for the novelty scores in Condition 1 (mean 
scores shown in Table IV; ANOVA shown in Table V). This AITOVA 
yielded no significant main or interaction effects, demonstrating 
that the infants did not respond differentially to the particular 
shapes. A comparable analysis of 2(Age) x 2(Sex) x 2(Types of Move­
ment . . . side-to-side vs. up-down movements) within Condition 2 
also produced no significant effects, indicating that the infants had 
not fixated the two movements differentially in this condition (mean 
scores shown in Table VI; AITOVA shown in Table VII) . However, the 
same analysis for Condition 3 did yield a significant movement effect 
(F(l,8)=8.07, p .05) in favor of the side-to-side motion (mean 
scores shown in Table VIII; AITOVA shown in Table IX). No other ef­
fects were significant in this Condition. The discrepant findings, 
regarding movement preferences in Conditions 2 and 3> are difficult to
k3
Table II
Analysis of Variance of Conditions 1 and 2
sv df SS MS F
Age 1 8.21 8.21 <  1.00
Sex 1 207.06 207.06 2.85
Condition 1 132.03 132.03 1.82
Age x Sex 1 l.kk l.kk 4  1.00
Age x Condition 1 1.12 1.12 1.00
Sex x Condition 1 78.13 78.13 1.07
Age x Sex x Condition 1 1.21 1.21 1.00









3 and 4 
MS E
Age 1 334.75 334.75 2.13
Sex 1 5.36 5.36 £ 1.00
Condition 1 492.19 492.19 3.13
Age x Sex 1 .01 .01 -d 1.00
Age x Condition 1 282.64 282.64 1.80
Sex x Condition 1 33.81 33.81 z . 1.00
Age x Sex x Condition 1 67.58 67.58 z . 1.00
















































Analysis of Variance of Condition 1
sv df SS MS F
Age 1 7-70 7.70 4 1.00
Sex 1 269.78 269.78 *+.*+9
Shape 1 180.20 180.20 3.00
Age x Sex 1 2.6*4- 2.6*+ ^  1.00
Age x Shape 1 20.00 20.00 <  1.00
Sex x Shape 1 1.77 1.77 < 1.00
Age x Sex x Shape 1 .70 .70 4 1.00
Error 8 *480.32 60.0*+
Table VI


























Analysis of Variance of Condition 2
sv df SS MS F
Age 1 1.62 1.62 £ 1.00
Sex 1 15.^0 15-^0 < 1.00
Movement 1 102.51 102.5i 1.30
Age x Sex 1 .01 .01 4 1.00
Age x Movement 1 26.27 26.27 ^ 1.00
Sex x Movement 1 200.95 200.95 2.^3
Age x Sex x Movement 1 70.10 70.10 << 1.00
Error 8 661.85 82.73
Table VIII 
Mean Novelty Scores in Condition 3
Movement
G-roup Side-to-Side Up-Down Total
5, Months
Males 70.10 51-30 60.70
Females 78.75 50.90 6^.82
Total 7 k . *+2 51.10 62.76
8 Months
Males 56.50 U5.55 51.18
Females 58.80 U5-55 51«l8
Total 57.80 U2.90 50.35
Overall
Males 63.^5 U8 .U2 55«9^ -
Females 68. U5 U5.58 57*17
Total 66.11 U7.OO 56.56
Table IX
Analysis of Variance of Condition 3
s v d f SS MS F
Age 1 6l6.28 616.28 3.1+0
Sex 1 6.13 6.13 1.00
Movement 1 11+61.10 ll+6l.l0 8 .07*
Age x Sex 1 33-35 33.35 1.00
Age x Movement 1 Tie 10 71.10 < 1.00
Sex x Movement 1 66.88 66.88 <  1.00
Age x Sex x Movement 1 .61+ .61+ <  1.00
Error 8 11+1+7.61+ 180.96
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explain. Had the side-to-side movement preference predominated in 
both conditions, one would be forced to look closely at the issue of 
stimulus equivalence and the effect that this may have had on all test 
results. However, the counterbalancing of movement stimuli throughout 
the experiment, coupled with the inconclusive movement preference 
findings just discussed, should reduce concern over the impact of this 
factor on other test results. No analysis was conducted for Condition 
1+ because both test stimuli involved change in this Condition. How­
ever, an 2(Age x 2(Sex) ANOVA for Condition k yielded no significant 
effects due to age or sex (Table X).
Familiarization
To determine whether the infants had comparable exposure to the 
familiarization stimuli in the four conditions, an 2(Age) x 2(Sex) x 
^(Condition) ANOVA was conducted for mean looking time across the six 
familiarization trials within each experimental session (Tables XI and 
XII). No main effects or interaction effects were statistically 
significant in either session 1 or session 2, indicating that the 
amount of looking time during familiarization was equivalent for 
Conditions, Age and Sex.
It was also of interest to determine whether there was evidence 
of habituation in either session, and whether its extent was compar­
able across Conditions. For this purpose, each infant’s total fixa­
tion time on trials 5 and 6 was subtracted from total fixation time 
on trials 1 and 2, and this difference was computed as a percentage of
total fixation on trials 1 and 2, f 5 , 6  - * 1,2
Fl,2
An 2(Age) x 2(Sex)
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Table X
Analysis of Variance of Condition k
SV _________ df____________ SS_____________ MS_______________ F__
Age 1 1.10 1.10 < 1.00
Sex l 33.O6 33*06 < 1.00
Age x Sex 1 3^*23 3^*23 <1.00
Error 12 723*^9 ' 60.29
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Table XI
Analysis of Variance of Mean Total Looking 
during Session 1 Familiarization Trials
sv df SS MS F
Sex 1 2.19 2.19 1.78
Age 1 2.12 2.12 1 .72
Condition 5 .12 .Oh < 1 .00
Sex x Age 1 2.16 2.16 1.76
Sex x Condition 3 3.16 1.05 <  1 .00
Age x Condition 3 2.70 .90 <  1 .00
Sex x Age x Condition 3 1 .52 .51 1 .00
Error kQ 59.01 1 .23
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Table XII
Analysis of Variance of Mean Total Looking 
during Session 2 Familiarization Trials
sv df SS MS F
Sex 1 .06 .06 4 1.00
Age 1 4 .6 l 4 .6 l 3.36
Condition 3 4.05 1.35 <  1.00
Sex x Age 1 2.15 2.15 1.57
Sex x Condition 3 5.13 1.71 1.25
Age x Condition 3 6.51 2.10 1-53
Age x Sex x Condition 3 2.18 .73 <  1.00
Error 48 65.92 1.37
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x ^(Condition) AITOVA was conducted for this score with a constant 
factor of 76.3 added, for each experimental session (mean scores 
shown in Tables XIII and XIV; ANOVAs shown in Table XV). No signifi­
cant results were obtained for either session, suggesting that the 
percentage decrease in looking time was comparable across Age, Sex, 
and Condition in both sessions 1 and 2. These same scores were next 
used to evaluate the absolute extent to habituation in both sessions. 
The mean percentage of decrease in the first session (l.4$>) and the 
second session (9*7$>) were compared against a chance score of Ojo in 
two separate t-tests. Of the two t-tests, only the results of the 
second session were significant (t(65)=3-59? P ^  .0005), indicating 
that habituation was evident in the second session but not in the 
first. This may suggest that two sessions were necessary before 
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aA constant factor of 76.3 was added to each score
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Table XIV
Mean Percentage of Decreased Looking Time 
in Session 2
Condit ions




























































£L ' /"A constant factor of 76.3 was added to each score
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Table XV
Analysis of Variance of Habituation Percentage Scores
in Sessions 1 and 2
Session 1
sv df SS MS F
Age 1 828.00 828.00 2.07
Sex 1 628.75 628 . 75 1.57
Condition 3 2365.57 788.52 1.97
Age x Sex 1 726.30 726.30 1.82
Age x Condition 3 8.90 2.98 < 1.00
Sex x Condition 3 1155.58 38 5 • 20 < 1.00
Age x Sex x Condition 3 1297.21 1+32.1+0 1.02
Error k8 19188.73 399.77
Session 2
SV df SS MS F
Age 1 120.72 120.72 < 1.00
Sex 1 53.81 53.81 ^  1.00
Condition 3 6i+o. 31+ 213.1+5 < 1.00
Age x Sex 1 111.59 111.59 < 1.00
Age x Condition 3 38I+.03 128.01 < 1.00
Sex x Condition 3 1I+91+.29 1+98.09 4 1.00
Age x Sex x Condition 3 1026.05 31+2.02 <. 1.00




Nelson’s functional hypothesis, it will he recalled, stated that 
function serves as the central core for concept acquisition in infancy. 
According to Nelson, an infant should look longer at a change in 
function than a change in form because of the essential information 
it provides about the particular concept being formed. In this study, 
function was synonymous with movement and form was synonymous with 
stimulus shape. The test results suggest that partial support for 
Nelson’s functional core hypothesis can be found in three of the over­
all novelty preference discrimination tests. First, the infants 
demonstrated discrimination of a novel movement pattern from a 
familiar movement pattern in Condition 2, suggesting that sufficient 
attention was paid to this variable to yield significant results. 
Secondly, attention to movement changes were also somewhat evident in 
the preference for a movement change, when contrasted with a shape 
change in Condition 3* This discrimination yielded strongly signifi­
cant results for the 5 month old infants and overall results which 
approached significance. Finally, the curious finding that neither 5 
nor 8 month old infants could discriminate simple shape change in 
Condition 1 provides possible support for Nelson’s predicted preference 
for movement change. It is quite well established that infants by 
5 months of age not only discriminate shapes (Cohen, DeLoache, and 
Strauss, 1979) "but they can also recognize shape constancy across 
changing colors and orientations (Caron, Caron, and Carlson, 1979;
6o
Schwartz, 1975)• It is possible that the infants in this study were 
so engrossed in watching the dynamic movement patterns that they simply 
ignored shape changes and thus did not discriminate between shapes during 
test trials. Before any conclusions could be reached regarding shape 
discrimination, it would be necessary in future research to compare 
the infants’ visual responses to static shape change with their visual 
responses to shape change when accompanied by movement to determine 
if movement does in fact overpower shape.
The lack of a significant overall "novelty" effect in the Move­
ment vs. Movement plus Shape Condition (Condition k) is not consistent 
with Nelson’s theory. She predicted longer fixation to the moderately 
discrepant movement change rather than the maximally discrepant move­
ment plus shape change. The former change, according to Nelson, would 
necessitate expansion of the concept formed during habituation while 
the latter change would not be in competition with the originally 
formed concept. The results in Condition k do not bear out this theory. 
Neither 5 or 8 month old infants demonstrated significantly increased 
looking to the movement change. It is possible that the infants in 
this study simply did not prefer the functional movement change as 
predicted by Nelson. It is alternately possible that the methodology 
employed in this study had an impact on test results in Condition b .
The stimulus changes in Condition U were more complex than those in 
the other three Conditions. It is plausible that sufficient encoding 
was not achieved during the test trials to allow lime for preferred 
looking towards one specific stimuli. Further assessment of the 
methodological considerations will be addressed in subsequent
6i
discussion.
Although the absolute movement effects generally support Nelson’s 
theory, with the exception just noted, the relative movement effects 
were, not as strong as anticipated. Movement change was not discrimi- 
nated^fco a greater extent than was shape change when Conditions 1 
(Shape'-Change) and 2 (Movement Change) were compared with one another, 
nor was movement change more strongly discriminated against a shape 
change than against a movement plus shape change when compared in 
Conditions 3 (Movement vs. Shape) and ^ (Movement vs. Movement plus 
Shape).
Drawing together the evidence supporting and refuting Nelson’s 
contention that infants prefer to focus on function over form for 
concept formation,., one thus finds mixed results. The infants appeared 
to pay more attention to movement changes than shape changes when the 
two were compounded as stimuli in the first two conditions. There was 
additionally some evidence of a preference for a movement change when 
contrasted with a shape change in Condition 3* There was no evidence, 
however, that the infants found a functional change more captivating 
than a combined functional-form change as predicted by Nelson.
In addition to addressing Nelson’s functional core hypothesis 
per se, this study also looked at possible age differences in the use 
of functional information for concept formation. The test results 
do not point to an obvious developmental trend in the use of function 
for conceptualization. It can only be concluded that functional 
properties appear as salient for 5 month old infants as they are for 
8 month olds. It is also important to, note that no indication of sex
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differences "was found in any of the analyses. None of the forementioned 
ANOVAs yielded significant main or interaction effects for sex as a 
variable. This appears to suggest that male and female infants per­
formed comparably throughout both the habituation trials and the test 
trials.
A number of methology factors could have distracted from the 
present findings and merit discussion. First, one might question 
whether or not the infants were sufficiently familiarized to the 
stimuli presented in trials 1-6. In contrast to the static pictures 
or slides usually presented as stimuli in this type of study, video­
tapes were used. Videotapes are, by their very nature, visually 
captivating for young infants.. This became obvious during the 
familiarization, trials. Although a statistically significant decrease 
in looking time did occur in the second session, the percentage of 
decreased looking (9-7%) was not as pronounced as one usually obtains 
with static stimuli. Two pieces of data, however, argue against the 
possibility of insufficient familiarization. First, the 8 month old 
infants did not habituate more strongly than the 5 months old infants 
although one would have expected them to process the stimuli more 
rapidly. Secondly, the test results in the second session were' not 
greatly different from the results in the first session, which one 
would have expected if familiarization was inadequate.. Together, these 
factors might suggest that the test results are not readily explain­
able by a possible lack of habituation.
The manner of presentation of stimuli is another methodological 
concern that could have attenuated test results. The infants grew
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accustomed to focusing their attention on a single stimulus during each 
habituation trial. They would see a moving figure on only the left or 
the right screen at any given time. During test, however, two complex, 
dynamically changing stimuli, which competed for the infant’s attention, 
were projected simultaneously on the left and right screens. This 
examiner observed that the majority of infants gave many short, quick, 
darting looks to the dual stimuli presented during test. This pattern 
appeared to continue through both the test sessions. Perhaps the 
infants continued these quick left and right looks for fear of missing 
any further changes on either screen. On the other hand the com­
plexity of simultaneous presentation of stimuli may have prevented the 
infant from having sufficient time to finish processing the essential 
information contained in the test stimuli before the end of the second 
session. It this .were the case and the infants had not completed en­
coding and comparing all the information contained in the two test 
stimuli prior to the end of the second session, it is doubtful that 
they could have demonstrated a strong visual preference to one 
particular stimulus. This factor could have had an impact on test 
results in all four Conditions.
In future research utilizing this same paired comparison technique, 
it may be beneficial to present two stimuli simultaneously during each 
familiarization trial. This would allow the infant to gain familiarity 
with the format of simultaneous presentations prior to the test trials. 
Additionally* it might be advantageous tu increase the length of each 
test trial to allow for more complete encoding of stimuli. Making 
these changes in the methodology could conceivably increase information
6b
processing and may allow for more meaningful responding on the infant's 
part to the questions posed by Nelson.
In summary, the results of this research provide some support for 
Nelson’s contention that function is at the core of concept formation. 
The results, however, are not conclusive and are possibly confounded 
by methodological considerations as discussed. The results do not 
point to a developmental age trend towards either increased or de­
creased use of functional attributes for concept acquisition, but 
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